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Theory suggests that tort reform could have either of two impacts on accidents.  First, 
reforms could increase accidents as tortfeasors internalize less of the costs of externalities, and 
thus, have less incentive to reduce the risk of accidents.  Second, tort reforms could decrease 
accidents as lower expected liability costs result in lower prices, enabling consumers to buy more 
risk-reducing products such as medicines, safety equipment, and medical services, and as 
consumers take additional precautions to avoid accidents.  We test which effect dominates by 
examining the effect of tort reforms on non-motor vehicle accidental death rates, using panel-
data techniques.  We find that caps on noneconomic damages, a higher evidence standard for 
punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform lead to fewer 
accidental deaths, while reforms to the collateral source rule lead to increased deaths.  Overall, 
the tort reforms in the states between 1981-2000 have led to an estimated 24,000 fewer 
accidental deaths. 1 
Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths 
 




Classical law and economics analysis of tort law treats torts as externalities.  A 
well-functioning legal system creates incentives for potential tortfeasors to internalize the 
costs of the externalities by making injurers liable for damages if a tort actually occurs.  
This leads to efficient behavior under many circumstances (Brown, 1973; Landes and 
Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987, 2004).  As a result, any “tort reform” that reduces the scope 
of liability could increase accident risk as potential tortfeasors internalize fewer costs.
1 
However, this premise depends on numerous assumptions.  These include:   
damages are pecuniary, not non-pecuniary; injurers and victims are strangers, and not in 
any pre-accident contractual relationship; victims as well as injurers have incentives to 
take optimal precautions; the system operates costlessly; and actions of tortfeasors are 
harmful, not protective.   
As modern liability has expanded to include product liability and medical 
malpractice and as the system has moved towards strict liability, these assumptions are 
increasingly subject to challenge.  Damages are now equally pecuniary and non-
pecuniary, so that non-pecuniary damages (such as pain and suffering) are about one half 
of all damage payments (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002).  For products liability and 
malpractice, victims and injurers are in a pre-injury contractual relationship.  The system 
is very costly to operate, with estimates of costs and fees of up to 54% of total spending 
(Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002).  Only $.22 of every dollar that goes through the tort 
system is returned to consumers for compensation for economic damages. Liability for 
many types of accidents is strict, with negligence of victims increasingly less important in 
determining damages and liability.   
Most importantly, many defendants in modern tort suits are actually engaged in 
reducing, not increasing, accident risk; this applies to makers of many products 
(medicines, protective equipment) and to physicians. For example, the American Trial 
                                                           
1 If liability is excessive, tort reform might be efficient, but in most cases would still lead to increased risk. 2 
Lawyers (ATLA) website lists “litigation groups,” “voluntary associations of ATLA 
members sharing an interest in a particular type of case.”  As of April 18, 2005, there 
were 73 such groups; of these, 30 were directly related to health providers, including 
categories such as “birth trauma,” “health care disability,” “medical negligence,” and 
“pharmacy liability.”  Thus, 40% of the litigation groups represent health related 
providers; the share of health spending in the economy is about 15%.    
These factors operate together to challenge the very basis of tort law (Calfee and 
Rubin, 1992).  Because injurers and victims are often in a pre-injury contractual 
relationship, victims will pay for potential damage payments ex ante in the form of higher 
prices.  The ex ante payments must cover not only pecuniary damages, but also non-
pecuniary damages and administrative costs.  As prices increase, consumers become less 
willing to pay for the goods and services covered by tort law. And because many of these 
goods and services would reduce risk, increasing tort liability may actually lead to 
increased, not reduced, accident risk.   
In addition, unpredictable and high liability costs may make it difficult or 
expensive for potential injurers to obtain insurance for their own liability (Priest, 1991).  
If liability insurance becomes very costly or is unavailable, suppliers may decide to stop 
supplying the goods and services altogether.    Again, if these goods and service are risk-
reducing, increasing tort liability may increase accidents.   
In contrast, tort reforms that decrease tort liability may make risk-reducing 
products more available and affordable, leading to a reduction in accidents.  In addition, 
tort reform may induce some accident victims to take more precaution because the 
amount of compensation in the event of an accident will be reduced.  Increased victim 
precaution could also reduce accidents.   
In this paper, we test whether tort reforms increase or decrease accidents.  Many 
aspects of the tort system and tort reform have been studied in detail.
2  The general 
findings are that tort reform reduces the number of lawsuits and amount of damages, and 
has improved the profitability of insurance companies.  Although no studies have 
examined the impact of tort reform on accidents, it is generally agreed by most 
                                                           
2 It is common to use state data to examine various effects of tort reform on variables of interest.  CBO 
(2004) provides a useful summary of this research.   3 
economists that “…if the liability system has a real purpose today, it must lie in the 
creation of incentives to reduce risk” (Shavell, 2004, at 268).  If it does not reduce risk, 
then there is a real question about the social purpose of the modern American tort system.  
Thus, to evaluate the merits of the tort system and decide on the benefits of tort 
reform it is necessary to examine the impact of tort reform on accidents.  Section II 
explores the theoretical relationship between specific tort reform and accidents.  Section 
III tests the relationship by investigating the association between tort reform and 
accidental death rates.  Section IV discusses implications and concludes. 
 
2. The Relationship Between Tort Reforms and Accidents 
 
In this section, we explore the relationship between tort reform and accidents.  We 
begin with a general discussion of the opposing effects of liability reduction on accidents.  
Then, we describe how some specific reforms should affect accidents.   
 
General relationship 
Although a few states have had reforms in place for several decades, the 
enactment of tort reforms increased dramatically in the mid-1980s in response to rising 
insurance costs (CBO, vii).
3  Since 1986, states have enacted various combinations of tort 
reforms.  Most state tort reforms are based on the premise that too many tort claims are 
filed and damage awards are too high.  As a result, almost all reforms try to limit the 
number of cases filed or the damages awarded. 
This reduction in expected liability may have two opposing effects on accidents.  
It may increase accidents as tortfeasors internalize less of the cost of externalities, and 
thus, have less incentive to reduce the risk of accidents.   
In contrast, reduced liability may decrease accidents for several reasons.  First, 
accidents may decrease if potential victims take more precaution.   Because tort reforms 
lower the liability faced by injurers, victims must bear more of the costs of accidents.  As 
a result, victims may take more precautions to avoid incurring higher accident costs.   
                                                           
3 The reforms were expected to lower insurance premiums by limiting liability exposure.  CBO reports that 
insurance premiums for some commercial policies fell by 40% in 1987, after increasing by 300% from 
1984-1986 (CBO, vii). 4 
Second, tort reform may decrease accidents as lower liability costs result in lower 
prices, enabling consumers to buy more risk-reducing products and services.  Because 
many potential injurers and victims are in pre-injury contractual relationships, such as 
manufacturers and consumers, injurers can pass along potential damage payments to 
victims in the form of higher prices.  When tort reforms decrease potential damage 
payments, potential injurers may respond by lowering prices.  Lower prices for risk-
reducing products, such as safety equipment, medicines, or medical services, enable 
consumers to buy more, and as more consumers purchase more risk-reducing products, 
accidents may decrease.   
There is indirect evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis.  Some studies 
have found that several different types of tort reforms have lowered liability costs by 
decreasing both lawsuits filed and damages awarded (Browne and Puelz, 1999; Yoon, 
2001).  Other studies have established that lower liability costs result in lower prices.  For 
example, Manning finds that that reductions in liability costs result in lower prices for 
both vaccines and prescription drugs (Manning, 1994; Manning, 1997).   
Finally, tort reform may decrease accidents by increasing the supply of risk-
reducing products.  Tort reforms not only decrease liability costs, they also make liability 
costs more predictable.  Lower, more predictable, liability costs make it cheaper and 
easier for potential injurers to obtain insurance for their own liability (Priest, 1991).   
Suppliers that were deterred from supplying products by the expense or lack of liability 
insurance before tort reforms may return to supplying goods and services when insurance 
becomes more affordable and available after tort reform.  Once again, if the goods and 
services that become available after tort reform are risk-reducing, then accidents may 
decrease after tort reform. 
There is also evidence to support this hypothesis.  Many studies find that tort 
reforms that reduce liability costs lower the cost of both medical malpractice and general 
liability insurance (Viscusi, et. al., 1993; Born and Viscusi, 1994; Born and Viscusi, 
1998; Thorpe, 2004; Viscusi and Born, 2005).  Other studies find that suppliers, in this 
case doctors, base supply decisions on the existence of tort reforms which lower 
insurance costs. For example, Klick and Stratmann (2003) find that tort reforms, in 
general, lead to increased numbers of physicians in a state.  Mello and Kelly (2005) find 5 
that many physicians decide not to locate in a jurisdiction (in their case, Pennsylvania) 
because of high malpractice premiums.  They find this effect for many classes of 
physicians, including those in emergency medicine.  They also find those physicians not 
leaving the state are less likely to practice high-risk specialties, including trauma care.  
Kessler et al. (2005) find an increase in the number of physicians in states that have 
adopted tort reform.  In the specific case of emergency physicians, they find that “direct 
reforms led to increased growth in the supply of emergency medicine physicians of 
approximately 11.5%, almost 3 times the magnitude of the average nongroup effect of 
3.9%.”  These findings may be particularly relevant for our analysis of accidental deaths, 
for a lack of emergency physicians will cause more accidents to lead to death.  
  Our empirical analysis is unable to differentiate between the possible mechanisms 
through which tort reform affects accidents.  Future work could explore which 
mechanisms are the most important. 
 
Specific tort reforms 
In the empirical section of this paper, we examine the relationship between 
accidental death rates and several different tort reforms: caps on noneconomic damages, 
caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence requirement for punitive damages, product 
liability reform, reforms to the prejudgment interest rule, reforms that allow courts to 
offset awards by the amount of collateral source payments, reforms that permit the 
admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments, or reforms to joint and several 
liability rules.  We now describe each tort reform and the possible effects of the reforms 
on death rates.  
  Noneconomic damages are damages for nonpecuniary losses such as pain and 
suffering, loss of consortium, emotional distress, and other intangible losses.   
Nonpecuniary losses are real losses.  However, in general they do not increase the 
marginal utility of wealth, and so consumers do not generally purchase insurance against 
this class of losses.  Moreover, this class of damages involves no direct economic loss 
and has no precise value.  Because of the intangibility of the losses and the lack of 
guidance from the courts on the value of the losses, jury awards for noneconomic 
damages are highly erratic.  Proponents of tort reform claim that noneconomic damage 6 
caps would make the damages more predictable and reduce the excessive size of the 
awards, promoting both more efficient deterrence and ease of settlement.   Moreover, 
reducing the unpredictability of damage awards may make provision of insurance easier 
and cheaper, and so some providers may be better able to purchase such insurance.  This 
may also lead to increased supplies of risk-reducing goods and services.   
Punitive damages are awarded not to compensate plaintiffs, but to punish 
defendants for intentional and malicious conduct and to deter future conduct.  Punitive 
awards are infrequent, but have increased in frequency and size in recent years.  As in the 
case of caps on noneconomic damages, tort reform proponents claim that caps are needed 
to make punitive damages more predictable and less excessive.  Again, this should 
improve the settlement process and achieve more efficient deterrence.   In most states, 
reforms to punitive damages have taken one of two forms: caps on punitive damages or 
higher evidence requirements before punitive damages are awarded. (The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also limited punitive damages, finding that in most cases a “single digit 
multiplier” is appropriate, so that punitive damages cannot in general be larger than 9 
times actual damages.
4)  
  Product liability law is intended to compensate consumers injured by defective 
products and deter manufactures from selling such products.  Supporters of tort reform 
claim that many product liability laws do not send clear signals to manufacturers about 
how to avoid liability and hold manufacturers liable for defects that it was impossible for 
them to anticipate (ATRA, 41).  These laws may also reduce the incentive of consumers 
to take optimal precautions.  Manufacturers may pass along liability risk to consumers in 
the form of higher prices, and often, manufacturers choose to quit producing certain 
products altogether to avoid liability.  Product liability reform is meant to alleviate these 
problems by imposing certain limits on manufacturers’ liability and eliminating absolute 
liability, replacing it with a rule requiring a product defect in order for a plaintiff to 
collect. 
  Prejudgment interest is interest that accrues on losses from the time of a tort to the 
time damages are paid.  Some of this interest is an actual cost to victims because if there 
                                                           
4 U. S. Supreme Court, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. V. Campbell Et Al., Certiorari To 
The Supreme Court Of Utah, No. 01–1289. Argued December 11, 2002—Decided April 7, 2003  7 
had been no tort, then the victim could have earned interest.  For example, a victim that 
covers his own medical costs until the injurer compensates him could have earned 
interest on the money.  In addition, allowing prejudgment interest may encourage early 
settlements and reduce delay in the disposition of cases.  However, tort reform 
proponents claim that allowing prejudgment interest can result in over-compensation and 
punish defendants for delays they may not have caused.  Also, recall that economic 
damages make up only 22% of total tort damages, so that only one-fourth of prejudgment 
interest would be paid on economic damages. Thus, most reforms limit the interest rate 
and include offers of judgment provisions.   
Collateral source rules prevent the admission of evidence at trial that shows that a 
plaintiff’s losses have been compensated by other sources, such as insurance or workers’ 
compensation.  Such rules promote efficient deterrence by requiring tortfeasors to pay 
damages even when victims have received payments from a collateral source.  However, 
proponents of tort reform claim that collateral source rules promote double recovery and 
result in higher insurance premiums.  Reforms to collateral source rules include allowing 
evidence of collateral source payments or completely offsetting awards by the amount of 
collateral source payments.  The result is that injured parties will collect from their own 
insurance companies but injurers may not pay anything.   
  Joint and several liability means that any party who was involved in causing a tort 
may be responsible for the entire cost of the tort, no matter how small the contribution 
may be.  Essentially, this allows plaintiffs to collect from “deep pockets” even if they 
were only marginal contributors.  Although the standard rule protects the rights of 
plaintiffs to be fully compensated, it often fails to equitably distribute liability among 
defendants. It may also create an incentive for some defendants to settle to avoid 
becoming liable for the entire loss, leaving others, who may be almost entirely blameless, 
liable for large damages.  Most reforms to the standard joint and several liability rules 
involve some sort of proportionate liability reform that limits exposure for those who 
played only a small part in causing the tort. 
  These tort reforms have the two opposing effects on accidents discussed above.  
That is, the reduction in liability should increase accident risk as potential tortfeasors 
internalize fewer costs.  On the other hand, the reforms may decrease accident risk if they 8 
result in increased supply and lower cost of risk-reducing products or services, including 
medical care, or if they lead consumers to be more careful.   Only empirical analysis will 
determine which effect dominates for each reform.
5 
 
3. Empirical Evidence of the Relationship Between Tort Reform and Accidental 
Death Rates 
 
Next, we test the theoretical relationship between tort reform and death rates 
discussed in Section II.  Figure I presents the average accidental, non-motor vehicle, 
death rates for the United States from 1980 to 2002.
6  We do not include motor vehicle 
death rates for several reasons.  These death rates are about one-half of all accidental 
deaths (National Safety Council, 2004).  But they are affected by many statutory changes 
in addition to tort reform, such as no-fault insurance laws (Cohen and Dehejia, 2004) and 
changes in speed limits.  Moreover, most tort reforms would have only indirect influence 
on motor vehicle tort law.  Nonetheless, we see in Table III that their inclusion does not 
have major implications for our results.  
We provide two empirical analyses.  First, we compare state death rates before 
and after tort reform and compare death rates in tort-reform states to death rates in non-
tort-reform states.  Then, we use panel data regressions to more systematically examine 
the relationship between tort reform and death rates.  We also examine the sensitivity of 
our regression results to alternative specifications.   
                                                           
5 In most tort cases, the accident occurs in the state where both the plaintiff and defendant reside.  In these 
cases, courts apply the laws and remedies of that state.  In contrast to other accident cases, product liability 
cases often involve resident of different states; in such cases, courts differ on which states’ law to apply.  
Some states use the law of the state where the accident occurred, the lex loci delicti rule (in 1990, 14 states 
used the lex loci delicti rule; in 2003, only 8 used this rule) (see Scoles, Hay, Borchers, and Symeonides, 
2004).  Other states use more flexible rules and consider which state has the most significant contacts with 
the parties, and the content of the substantive laws of the contact states.   In product liability cases, the 
relevant contacts are the plaintiff’s state of residence, the state where the injury occurred, the state where 
the product was purchased, the state where the product was manufactured, and the principal place of 
business for the defendant.  However, even in multistate products-liability cases, most cases (76%) applied 
the law of a state with plaintiff-affiliating contacts, and only 4% of the cases involved actual forum 
shopping, and 4% involved borderline forum shopping (Symeonides, 2004). 
6 From 1981-2002, the non-motor vehicle accidental deaths are 22% falls, 17% poisonings, 12% 
unspecified, 10% drowning, 10% suffocation,  9% fires, and 6% adverse effects to medical care or drugs. 
(Center for Disease Control, WISQARS Leading Causes of Death Reports, 1981-2002).  9 
 Comparing death rates before-and-after tort reform 
Table I displays a comparison of death rate trends in the years before and after the 
enactment of certain tort reforms, as well as the number of instances each tort reform was 
enacted.
7  The second column in Table I reports the median percentage change in 
accidental, non-motor vehicle death rates from two years to one year before each tort 
reform is enacted. The third column is the median percentage change in accidental, non-
motor vehicle death rates from the year before to the year after each tort reform is 
enacted.  The fourth and fifth columns in Table I present the difference in the death rate 
changes between tort-reform and non-tort-reform states.  Specifically, we calculated the 
average percentage change in death rates in the year before and after each tort reform, 
and then compared the change in death rates in each tort-reform state to this average.   
The second and third column show that death rates decreased in the years that five 
of the seven tort reforms were enacted.
 8 For three of these reforms, death rates were 
increasing in the years prior to enactment, but began decreasing the year after.   
The last two columns reveal that tort-reform states experienced larger-than-
average decreases (or smaller-than-average increases) in accidental, non-motor-vehicle 
death rates in the years after five of the reforms were enacted.  Prior to three of the 
reforms, the tort-reform states had the opposite relationship with the average; they had 
experienced smaller-than-average decreases (or larger-than-average increases) in the 
years before the reforms were enacted.  
This analysis controls for no other factors affecting death rates.  The relationship 
between tort reform and death rates is tested more systematically in the next section.   
 
Panel-data regressions 
Although the preceding analysis suggests an impact of some tort reforms on 
accidental deaths, it controlled for no other factors affecting death rates.  To explore the 
                                                           
7 Because some states enacted the same tort reform more than once (i.e. the second reform was enacted 
after the first was found unconstitutional), there may be more reforms enacted than states with each reform. 
8 The conclusions are the same if the mean percentage change is used, instead of the median percentage 
change. 10 
relationship between tort reform and death rates more systematically, we use a state-level, 
panel data set from 1981-2000.
9  We estimate regressions of the form: 
(1) st t s st st st Z TORTREFORM DeathRate ε φ δ χ β α + + + + + = ) ln(  
where s indexes states and t indexes time.  The left-hand-side variable is the logged 
accidental, non-motor-vehicle death rate.  Z  is a vector of state-level controls that 
includes the unemployment rate, real per capita personal income, the percent of the state 
population that is African-American, the percent of the state population that belongs to 
another minority racial group, the percent of the state population that is age 4 or under, 
the percent of the state population that is age 65 or over, the percent of the state 
population that is male between the ages of 15 and 24, the per capital alcohol 
consumption, and the number of hospital beds per capita.  The variables and sources are 
described in the Data Appendix, and Table II presents the summary statistics for each 
variable. 
In equation (1), δs and φt represent state and year fixed effects.  All regressions are 
weighted least squares with weights based on state populations.    
  The tort reforms we include are dummy variables for whether a state has a cap on 
noneconomic damages, a cap on punitive damages, a higher evidence requirement for 
punitive damages, product liability reform, reforms to the prejudgment interest rule, 
reforms that allow courts to offset awards by the amount of collateral source payments, 
reforms that permit the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments, or 
reforms to joint and several liability rules.
10   The coefficient estimates and standard 
errors for the tort reform variables are shown in the first row in Table III.
11 
The coefficients on five of the tort reform variables are negative and significant, 
indicating that these reforms are associated with lower death rates. 
12  The coefficients on 
                                                           
9 Some of the variables are not available after 2000. 
10 States often pass several tort reforms at the same time.  Therefore, estimating separate regressions for 
each tort reform variable would create bias if one dummy variable picks up the effect of another highly 
correlated dummy variable. 
11 The coefficients (standard errors) of the control variables in the primary regression are: unemployment 
rate: -0.008 (0.003)*; real per capita personal income: -0.000005 (0.000007); percent African American: -
0.003 (0.006); percent other minority group: -0.02 (0.006)*; percent age 4 and under: 0.007 (0.10); percent 
age 65 and over: 0.012 (0.009); percent male age 15 to 24: -0.004 (0.012); per capita alcohol consumption: 
0.057 (0.031)+; per capita hospital beds: -48.57 (2.94)*. *, significant at the 5% level.  
12 When each tort reform is estimated in a separate regression, the results become even stronger, possibly 
indicating that dummy variables are picking up the effects of other reforms.  In the separate regressions, the 11 
the two collateral source reform dummy variables are positive and significant.  This 
suggests that modification and abolishment of the collateral source rule are associated 
with higher death rates.  This is an interesting result; Klick and Stratmann (2003) find 
that collateral source reform leads to higher infant mortality rates.  No other reform has 
consistent results in their paper.  Apparently for this variable, the externality increasing 
effect outweighs the safety increasing effect.  Note that other reforms reduce the amount 
of damage payments for a harmful event, while collateral source reform may lead injurers 
to paying nothing at all in certain circumstances.   Thus, it may not be surprising that this 
reform has larger injury increasing effects than do others.  A more efficient reform might 
be increased subrogation (in which the injured party’s insurance company pays the victim 
and then collects from the injurer) since this will maintain incentives for internalization 
while still avoiding double compensation to victims.  
We use the results from the primary regression in Table III to estimate real-world 
magnitudes of the tort reforms’ effects on death rates; the results of these computations 
are presented in Table IV.
13  As the table shows, the percentage changes in accidental 
deaths range between 2 percent and 5 percent, depending on the tort reform.  However, 
even modest percentage changes translate into a substantial number of lives saved: we 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dummy variable for a punitive damages cap is negative and significant.  The punitive damages cap may 
have been significant in the separate regressions because of bias, or it may be insignificant in the combined 
regression because of multicollinearity. 
13 The magnitudes are computed by comparing the number of accidental deaths in states with each type of 
tort reform to what this number would have been had there been no tort reform.  The percentage difference 
in death rates between tort reform states and non-tort reform states is 100*[exp(β)-1], where β is each 
coefficient estimate (Wooldridge, 2003, at 226).  For example, in 2000, there were 9098 deaths in states 
with caps on non-economic damages, but there would have been approximately 9431 deaths if there had 
been no caps (9098 is a 3.53% decrease from 9431).  Similarly, in 2000, there were 37,296 deaths in states 
with higher evidence standards for punitive damages, 31,860 deaths in states with product liability reform, 
12,615 deaths in states with prejudgement interest reform, 20,855 deaths in states with reforms that allow 
courts to offset awards by the amount of collateral source payments, and 12,400 deaths in states with 
reforms that permit the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments.  To compute the total lives 
saved or lost, we did the same calculations on the number of accidental deaths across all states and years 
that had each tort reform, instead of just 2000 deaths. 12 
estimate that tort reforms saved almost 2,000 lives in the year 2000.
14  Computed over all 
states and years that had each reform, approximately 24,000 lives have been saved.
15    
 
 Sensitivity analysis 
We also examine the sensitivity of the tort reform coefficients to a range of 
alternative specifications.  The second through twelfth rows of results in Table III reveal 
the coefficient estimates and standard errors from alternative specifications of the 
primary model.  The table shows that the results of the primary model are robust to many 
different specifications. 
The second row reports the results when Alaska is excluded from the estimation 
of equation (1).   This estimation tests the sensitivity of the results to eliminating states 
with high death rates; the mean death rate in Alaska is over 7 standard deviations above 
the population-weighted mean death rate of all states.  The third row reports the results of 
an estimation that uses all accidental deaths, including motor-vehicle deaths, as the 
dependent variable.  This specification tests the robustness of our results to the type of 
accidental deaths used as the dependent variable.  The fourth row presents the results of 
the tort reform variables with Newey-West standard errors, where the error structure is 
assumed to be heteroskedastic and possibly autocorrelated up to lag(2).
16  The fifth row 
presents the results from an estimation that uses the death rate as the dependent variable, 
instead of the log of the death rate.  The sixth row reports results from an estimation that 
includes state-specific trends.  The seventh row presents results from a specification that 
                                                           
14 The 95% confidence interval for the number of lives saved or lost by each tort reform in 2000 is: cap on 
noneconomic damages (96-577 saved), higher evidence standard for punitive damages (313-1664 saved), 
product liability reform (561-1989 saved), prejudgement interest reform (288-1016 saved), collateral source 
reforms that offset awards (424-1439 lost), and collateral source reforms that allow admission of evidence 
of collateral source payments (18 saved – 599 lost). 
15 The 95% confidence interval for the number of lives saved or lost by each tort reform for all years is: cap 
on noneconomic damages (1512-9069 saved), higher evidence standard for punitive damages (3760-19979 
saved), product liability reform (7450-26438 saved), prejudgement interest reform (4032-14229 saved), 
collateral source reforms that offset awards (6397-21728 lost), and collateral source reforms that allow 
admission of evidence of collateral source payments (279 saved – 9096 lost).  In a previous version, we 
estimated that the total number of lives saved was 14,222. This estimate was lower than the current 
estimate because the previous regression did not include a dummy-variable for joint-and-several liability 
reform. Adding this dummy variable changes the magnitudes of the coefficients.  The changes are not 
major; no coefficient changed by more than .9 although the effect of the changes seems large.   
16 The lag is estimated by 0.75*T^(1/3) where T is the number of periods (Stock and Watson, 2002). 13 
excludes all controls except for state and year fixed effects.  The eighth row shows results 
from unweighted panel data regressions, as opposed to population weighted.   
Next, we investigate the robustness of our results to the possible endogeneity of 
the tort reform variables.  It is very unlikely that reverse causation is driving our primary 
results.
17  Several papers have concluded that the primary drivers of tort expansion and 
tort reform are the relative power of lawyers and businesses in a state, not death rates 
(This literature is summarized in Rubin, 2005).  If anything, increasing death rates should 
lead to more tort reform: increases in death rates increase tort claims which should 
motivate potential defendants to fight for tort reform to lower liability damage payments.  
However, this relationship would cause a bias in the opposite direction of our results: we 
should find a positive relationship between tort reform and death rates, not a negative 
one.  The ninth row presents results from an IV estimation using the following variables 
as instruments for the enactment of each tort reform: the percentage of the state 
legislature that was Republican and the per capita number of people employed in the 
legal profession.
18   
We also test whether the decrease in accidental deaths happened before the 
enactment of tort reform, and thus, can not be attributed to tort reform.  The tenth and 
eleventh rows report results of estimations that include one-year and two-year leads, 
respectively, to indicate one and two years before each tort reform was passed.  That the 
majority of the coefficients are statistically insignificant suggests that accidental death 
rates did not begin decreasing in the years before tort reform.    
Next, we test whether tort reforms in one state affect death rates in another, 
nearby state.  Inter-state effects in the same direction as the state effects could be 
evidence of a broader, regional force driving the relationship between tort reform and 
                                                           
17 Endogeneity tests confirm that OLS is a consistent estimator for equation (1) for all tort reforms. 
18 The instruments perform extremely well in the first-stage regressions. The F-statistics average over 16.0, 
and the instruments are positive and significant for most of the tort reform variables.  Because of the 
impracticality of finding eight or more instrumental variables, we estimate a separate regression for each 
tort reform variable.  Some bias is likely in separate regressions as dummy variables pick up the effect of 
other highly correlated dummy variables.  Thus, we also perform an IV estimation where the tort reform 
variable is one when a state has enacted any of the following tort reforms: a cap on noneconomic damages, 
a cap on punitive damages, a higher evidence requirement for punitive damages, product liability reform, 
reforms to the prejudgment interest rule, or reforms to joint and several liability rules, and zero otherwise.  
Using the same instruments, the coefficient on this combined tort reform variable is also negative and 
significant, with a coefficient of -0.70. 14 
accidental deaths, or they could be evidence of spillover effects—perhaps people across 
the border will travel into the tort reform state to gain more access to medical care.  Inter-
state effects in the opposite direction as state effects could be evidence of doctors moving 
to nearby tort reform states, which would decrease death rates in the tort reform states 
and increase death rates in the doctors’ original states.   The twelfth row reports the 
results of an estimation that includes dummy variables that indicate whether any other 
state in the region
19 has each tort reform.  Although most coefficients are insignificant, 
the inter-state effects are opposite the state effects for three tort reforms, and in the same 
direction as the state effects for one tort reform.   
Finally, we estimate a separate regression to determine whether stricter caps with 
lower dollar limits have a stronger effect on death rates than more lenient caps with high 
dollar limits.
20  The coefficient on the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages is 
positive and significant.
21  This indicates that a cap with a lower dollar limit, or a more 
stringent cap, is associated with lower death rates.
22    
 
4. Conclusion 
The U.S. tort system is a more significant economic factor than the tort system of 
any other country.  It is estimated that the U.S. tort system costs about 2.3% of GDP; for 
no other country was the amount more than 1.3% of GDP (Italy) and the average for all 
OECD countries was .9% (Rubin, 1995, using data from Tillinghast-Towers Perrin).  It is 
an extremely expensive system, and can be justified only if it provides substantial 
deterrence.
23  Our paper suggests that not only does the tort system not deter deaths, it 
may actually increase the number of accidental deaths.   
                                                           
19 We use the standard regional categories: South, Northeast, Midwest, and West. 
20 For the variable measuring the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages, states with no caps are 
assigned values equal to one dollar more than the highest cap ($875,001).  This variable is meant to 
represent the maximum amount a potential tortfeasor would expect to pay in damages.  Thus, for states 
with no caps, this variable could actually take on values near infinity.  To be more realistic about how much 
potential tortfeasors expect to pay, and to not bias the results by assigning huge values to no-cap states, we 
assign values only slightly higher than the cap states.  Assigning even larger values does not change the 
sign or significance of the results. 
21 The coefficient (standard error) on the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages is 0.00000006 
(.00000003)*. 
22 We do not have a variable measuring the amount of the cap on punitive damages because the state rules 
vary widely and apply in different situations and with different conditions. 
23 “Thus, the use of the liability system will be socially worthwhile if and only if the savings from accident 
reduction it brings about exceed its administrative costs.”  Shavell, 2004, at 284.   15 
Although the theoretical predictions about the relationship between tort reform 
and accidents is mixed, our empirical evidence suggests that several tort reforms—caps 
on noneconomic damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product 
liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform—are associated with decreases in 
accidental death rates.  In contrast, reform of the collateral source rule is associated with 
increases in accidental death rates.  Net, we estimate that the series of tort reforms 
adopted in the states between 1981 and 2000 have saved approximately 24,000 lives.  
The results are robust to several alternative specifications. 
Our results suggest that certain reforms are needed to make the current tort system 
more effective.  Proponents of tort reform should concentrate on caps on noneconomic 
damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and 
prejudgment interest reform.  There should be less attention paid to collateral source 
reform, although improvements in the subrogation process may be able to eliminate 
double compensation and preserve incentives for safety. 
There are also implications for further research.  It is interesting and important to 
determine which mechanisms are driving the relationship between tort reform and 
accidents.  In addition, although our methods apply only to state-level reforms, many tort 
laws have cross-state effects.  For example, the prices of pharmaceutical and other safety-
increasing products are set in a national market, so that state-level reform variables would 
not capture the effects of reforms with a national impact.  Our analysis suggests that such 




Death Rate Data 
Data on death rates are from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National 
Centers for Injury Prevention and Control. Web-based Injury Statistics Query and 
Reporting System (WISQARS).  Available from: www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars 
 
Tort Reform Variables 
Tort reform data are from the American Tort Reform Association.  Most data are 
compiled in the Tort Reform Record (July, 2005) available at: 
http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7927_Record7-05.pdf. Additional data are available from 
the ATRA Issues section of the website, available at: http://www.atra.org/display/19.  
 
Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment rate data were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm.  
 
Income 
Per capita income data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/.  The nominal data were changed into real using 
consumer price index series (with 1983/1984 as the base year) obtained from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu.  
 
Demographic Variables 
Age, gender, race, and population data were compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Population Division, available at: http://www.census.gov/popest/states/. 
 
Per Capita Alcohol Consumption 
This variable is the per capita ethanol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits for each 
state.  It is obtained from the National Institute of Health, National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism, available at: http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/databases/consum03.htm. 
 
Hospital Beds per Capita 
Data on per capita beds in hospitals that are AHA members (excluding nursing homes) is 
compiled from American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics annual publications. 
 
Legal Services per Capita 
This variable is the per capita number of employees engaged in legal services.  Legal 
services include all for-profit and nonprofit establishments which are headed by members 
of the bar and are engaged in offering legal advice or legal Services.  The data is 
available from the U.S. Census Bureau at: http://censtats.census.gov/ 
 
Voting Data 
The data on voting in presidential elections is from The Atlas of U.S. Presidential 
Elections by Dave Leip.  The data is available online at: http://www.uselectionatlas.org/.  
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Change in Rates in 
the Year Before tort 
reform 
Median Percentage 
Change in Rates in  




in Rates in the Year 
Before tort reform 
Median Percentage 
Change Difference 
in Rates in the Year 





Cap on Noneconomic 
Damages 
 
3.37 -4.72 1.76  -2.56  15 
Cap on Punitive Damages 
 
1.07 -1.94 -0.2  -2.47  20 
Higher Evidence Standard 
for Punitive Damages 
 
-0.08 -0.5 0.29  -0.36  32 
Product Liability Reform 
 
-.94 1.17  -0.03  0.31  25 
Collateral Source Reform: 
Offset Awards 
 
0.82 1.31  -0.27  2.90  18 
Collateral Source Reform: 
Admit Evidence 
 
2.17 -2.85 0.57  -2.39  17 
Prejudgment Interest Reform 
 
-0.4 -4.7  -0.86  -2.24  14 
Joint-and-Several Liability 
Reform 


















accidental, non-motor vehicle death rate  19.48  3.31  2.0 
amount of cap on noneconomic damages  833,257.9  134,350.1  42,392.67 
unemployment rate  6.32  2.10  1.72 
real per capita personal income  12,154.45  1924.38  1342.17 
percent African-American  12.35  8.03  0.54 
percent other minority  3.92  5.24  1.10 
percent age 4 and under  7.39  0.78  0.39 
percent age 65 and over  11.49  1.94  0.64 
percent male age 15 - 24  7.73  0.89  0.77 
per capital alcohol consumption  2.38  0.45  0.25 
hospital beds per capita  0.003  0.0008  0.0006 
legal services per capita  0.003  0.002  0.0005 
vote 47.82  9.71  8.41 
      Notes: The values reported in the table are means of annual, state-level observations for the period 1981-2000.  The values 
  are population weighted averages.  All summary statistics are based on 1020 observations. See Data Appendix for further details.    
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Table III 


















































































3. Death Rate Includes   

















4. Standard Errors 
Corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity 




















































7. No Control Variables 




















































Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table III (continued) 






















































































12. Tort Reform 
Variables Indicate 
Reforms in other 

















Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 23 
 
Table IV: 





Average Effect on 
Annual Death 
Rates of Each 
Tort Reform 
 
Number of Lives 
Saved or Lost in 
2000  
Total Lives 
Saved or Lost 
Across all 
Years 
    
cap on noneconomic damages 
 
-3.54%  333 saved  5,242 saved 
higher evidence standard for 
punitive damages  
 
-2.57%  982 saved  11,798 saved 
product liability reform  
 
-3.83%  1267 saved  16,841 saved 
prejudgment interest reform  
 
-4.88%  647 saved  9,060 saved 
collateral source reform: offset 
awards 
+4.71%  938 lost  14,160 lost 
collateral source reform: admit 
evidence 







Notes: These computations are based on the coefficients from the primary regression (Table III) and the 





Accidental, Non-Motor Vehicle Death Rate: 




































Source: Center for Disease Control, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, WISQARS Injury 
Mortality Reports, 1981-2002.  
 